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Abstract
Gender is now recognized as an important dividing line in American political life, and
scholars have accumulated evidence that national security issues are an important
reason for gender differences in policy preferences. We therefore expect that the
dynamics of support for defense spending among men and women will differ. In
contrast, several scholars have shown that population subgroups exhibit a ‘‘parallel’’
dynamic in which the evolution of their preferences over time is very similar, despite
differences in the average level of support. Unfortunately, there is little time series
evidence on gendered reactions to policy, including defense spending, that would
allow one to arbitrate between these competing perspectives. In this research note,
we assemble a time series of support for defense spending among men and women
and model the determinants of that support for the period 1967–2007. We find that
women are on average less supportive of defense spending than are men. However,
we also find that the over time variation of support for defense spending among men
and women is very similar—each is conditioned principally by the past year’s change
in defense spending and occasionally by war casualties and a trade-off between
defense and civilian spending.
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Gender is now widely recognized as an important dividing line in American political
life. Studies of policy preferences, partisanship, political engagement, and voting
behavior reveal substantial differences in what men and women want from govern-
ment and how they translate these preferences into political action. Reflecting on
this literature and summarizing their own research, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
observe that ‘‘Gender has moved from a position of irrelevance to American political
behavior to one of now substantial import. The possibility exists that it may become
central’’ (2002, 176).
However, scholars also know that gender differences are contextual (Sapiro 2003).
The magnitude of gender difference in preferences and behavior varies with circum-
stance. In some years, on some issues the gender divide is large, while on others it is
small or nonexistent. Yet, while political and economic circumstances vary together
with gender differences over time, with very few exceptions studies of the phenom-
enon focus on one point in time—usually an election year that produces a national
election study. As a result, although we know from many snapshots in time that there
are differences between women and men on a variety of political issues, there is little
research that models the dynamic process that produces these differences.1
The lack of time series evidence on gender differences is important for another rea-
son: some studies of public opinion have shown that population subgroups exhibit a
‘‘parallel’’ dynamic in which the movement of subgroup policy preferences over time
is very similar, despite differences in the average level of support. That is, although
average levels of support for public spending programs (including defense) differ sub-
stantially among income, educational, and partisan subgroups within the population,
the movement of preferences around these average differences is actually quite similar
(Page and Shapiro 1991, 285-321; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Enns and
Kellstedt 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2008). This body of research obviously chal-
lenges the hypothesis of a gendered dynamic to defense spending preferences.
However, gender differences on policy preferences have not been studied in the
time-series context, so it is difficult to arbitrate between competing claims. In this
article, we evaluate the gender hypothesis and the parallel public hypothesis by spe-
cifying a time-series model of variation in gender differences on the issue of defense
spending in the United States. The rationale for this focus is straightforward. First,
national security is a centrally important national issue and one on which cross-
sectional studies have found significant gender differences. Second, the defense bud-
get enjoys high salience, a fact reinforced by the yearly cycle in which the budget is
introduced, debated, and appropriated, and previous studies have shown that public
opinion is attuned to these debates. Third, there are indications in the literature that
preferences on defense spending and social spending are an important part of gender
differences, with men being relatively more favorable to defense, women relatively
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more favorable to social spending, and the two genders divided on the question of
whether defense or social spending should receive priority when the two come into
conflict. Not only does this suggest that men and women might react differently to
change in the defense budget; it also suggests that any clash in competing priorities
will widen those differences.
We proceed as follows: in the following section, we briefly review evidence on
the presence or absence of gender differences in three types of research: studies of
citizen policy preferences, election studies, and studies of support for using military
force. We find that gender differences are present in all three types of study,
although they vary in magnitude. In a subsequent section, we describe a yearly time
series of gender differences in attitudes toward defense spending constructed from
opinion surveys administered over the period 1965–2007. These data reveal substan-
tial variation in the magnitude of gender differences in support for defense spending.
We subsequently specify a regression model of support for defense spending to
explain these variations and estimate the model for men and women. We find sub-
stantial support for the parallel public thesis and less for the gender thesis: the over
time variation of support for defense spending among men and women is very sim-
ilar. Each is conditioned principally by the past year’s change in defense spending
and occasionally by war casualties and a trade-off between defense and civilian
spending. The concluding section discusses the implications of our results.
Gender Difference and Parallel Publics
The 1980s saw the emergence of a substantial gender difference in voting behavior,
and this development stimulated research on a number of important questions: Do
women and men have fundamentally different policy preferences? Do they vote dif-
ferently on the same issues, or do they base their vote on altogether different issues?
What is the role of national security in producing gender differences?
Policy preferences. The pioneering study of gender difference in policy preferences
was Shapiro and Mahajan (1986). Employing a large database of survey marginals
from the 1960s to the 1980s, they found substantial gender differences that were
largest for issues of national and domestic security (see also Smith 1984). Gender
differences on what the authors called ‘‘compassion’’ or ‘‘caring’’ issues—such as
income supports and health care—were also prominent but less so than on national
security issues (p. 51). This finding was reinforced in a study of the role of policy
preferences in explaining gender difference in President Reagan’s job approval rat-
ings (Gilens 1988). Strikingly, Gilens (1988) found that it was differential gender
preferences on the issues of defense spending and social spending that produced the
largest gender differences in Reagan’s approval ratings. Moreover, these effects
were stronger than partisanship in explaining Reagan approval. As a result, Gilens
asserts that ‘‘gender differences in the evaluation of politicians will extend beyond
President Reagan and are likely to appear whenever military or social welfare issues
figure prominently in the public’s assessment . . . ’’ (p. 45).
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Whether latent gender divisions on social and defense spending prove politically
relevant is likely to depend on the policies that Presidents adopt—the Reagan defense
increases were among the highest in the postwar period—but subsequent studies have
demonstrated that gendered preferences themselves extend past the Reagan era. For
example, studying a myriad of policy items from election studies over the period
2000–2004, Crowder-Meyer once again found large, consistent gender differences
on defenses issues (including defense spending) and social welfare issues. Further-
more, Crowder-Meyer shows that men and women differ both in their prioritization
of these issues and in their propensity to condition their voting behavior on these
issues. Men are more likely to give defense a higher priority and to base their evalua-
tion of candidates on the issue. Women, in contrast, rank social welfare higher and are
more likely to condition candidate evaluations on the issue (Crowder-Meyer 2007).
Taken together, these studies provide evidence that women are less supportive of
defense spending than men, more supportive of social spending and that women are
less sensitive to the constraints of deficits and debt. This pattern is summarized
nicely in a Gallup poll conducted in 1990, as the cold war came to an end and the
prospect of a ‘‘peace dividend’’ from cuts in defense spending appeared on the pub-
lic agenda (Table 1). The value of the question in Table 1 is somewhat diluted by the
strong cue on social spending; it takes a rather heartless soul to oppose spending for
‘‘homelessness, poverty, drugs, and education.’’ Nonetheless, despite this cue—or
indeed perhaps because of it—the gender divide in this question is revealing.
Although a slight majority of men do favor increasing social spending to reducing
the deficit, the margin among woman in favor of social spending is overwhelming.
Issue voting, partisanship, and gender. Not surprisingly perhaps given the promi-
nence of gender differences in policy preferences, studies have demonstrated that
these differences often translate into gender differences in political behavior. For
example, Kaufman and Petrocik (1999) studied the impact of gender difference in
policy attitudes on both party identification and the vote in the 1992 and 1996 pres-
idential elections. The results are clear: social spending and defense-related attitudes
Table 1. Gender and the Peace Dividend
Question wording ‘‘If the defense budget is cut sharply, money would be available to be spent in
other ways. Do you think this money should mainly be used to increase spending on social
problems such as homelessness, poverty, drugs, and education: or should this money mainly
be used to reduce the federal budget deficit?’’
Men Women
Increase spending on social problems 52 70
Reduce the deficit 36 18
Both (volunteered) 10 8
Don’t know 2 6
Note: w2 ¼ 56.07, prob ¼ .000.
Source: Gallup Poll, January 4–7, 1990 (N ¼ 1,226); Roper Center Study. USGALLUP.010890.R11.
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are strong correlates of party identification and voting in 1992 and 1996 (along with
other policy attitudes). The import of the study is the finding that the political judg-
ments of both men and women are indeed rooted in defense, social, and other polit-
ical issues, a finding that would suggest that over time variation in gender
differences on these issues should be related to government policy in these areas
(Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; see also Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998).
In summary, just as studies show a consistent gender divide in policy preferences
and priorities, scholarship also shows that these preferences translate into political
behavior. Although the impact of specific issues varies over particular elections,
either defense or social preferences are an important correlate of the vote in most
elections. This suggests that voters pay attention to government policy in these areas,
and the differences in the priorities of men and women on the issues suggest that
their reaction to government policy should be gendered as well.
The use of military force. When research turns to the actual use of military force,
gender differences are consistent and prominent. One of the most comprehensive
studies documents the existence of significant gender differences in the United
States and Great Britain on a number of national security issues, including the fear
of war; the use of military force in Korea and Vietnam; and the testing, deployment,
and potential use of nuclear weapons (Brandes 1994). Nincic and Nincic (2002) find
the same gender difference concerning the wars in Korea and Vietnam, and they
report the additional finding that women were less likely to support escalation and
more likely to favor a negotiated settlement (2002, 550). Similar findings emerged
in studies of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 (Brandes 1994; Conover and Sapiro 1993;
Nincic and Nincic 2002).
In addition, studies highlight the greater sensitivity of women to casualties in war
(Brandes 1994; Conover and Sapiro 1993). A unique tracking study conducted during
the Persian Gulf crisis from August through December 1990 queried almost 17,000
respondents on their opinions of President George H. W. Bush’s handling of the crisis,
support for an eventual attack against Iraq, and willingness to absorb the costs of the
war. The results were striking: gender differences on all of these questions were high,
but on the question of the human costs of war, gender was the single most important
influence on public opinion (Wilcox, Ferrara, and Alsop 1993, 343-59).
A summary conclusion would be that it is rare to find scholarship in which gender
differences on the question of using military force are not present (Eichenberg
2003). This pattern alone would suggest gendered reactions to the defense budget,
since it is the monetary instrument of armed conflict.
The competing hypothesis of parallel publics. That women and men often differ in
their preferences and political behavior is well established. However, there is grow-
ing evidence that this sort of difference between population subgroups does not vary
over time. In their early work, for example, Page and Shapiro found that subgroup
differences, once established, change only little. Instead, opinions—including those
of women and men—move largely in tandem, a pattern they characterize as ‘‘paral-
lel publics’’ (Page and Shapiro 1991, 294). Page and Shapiro speculate that the
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parallel movements of opinion are attributable to centralization of the mass media—
all segments of the population receive essentially the same information at the same
time (p. 295). This hypothesis receives support in the work of Enns and Kellstedt,
who find—surprisingly—that citizens of both high and low political sophistication
respond to information in a similar fashion: ‘‘ . . . the subgroups generally changed
opinion at the same time, in the same direction, and to about the same extent . . . for
predominantly the same reasons’’ (2008, 433; see also Enns 2006). Similar results
for subgroups representing income, education, and partisanship were found by Sor-
oka and Wlezien (2008). In all of these works, the conclusion is that substantial dif-
ferences may characterize the preferences of population subgroups, but these gaps
change only little. Thus, despite the substantial evidence that women and men do
differ in their national security preferences, there remains the possibility that there
will be little over time variation in these differences.
Describing Gender Differences over Time
The largest challenge to evaluating the ideas discussed above is the task of assembling a
time series of gendermarginal on the questionof support for defense spending.Asnoted
previously, there has been little time series research on gender politics generally. The
major reason is that historical gender breakdowns are not always published by survey
organizations or scholarly studies. The data exist, but they must be retrieved from a
number of print and electronic sources or downloaded and tabulated from original data
sets that in some cases require reprocessing from older data storage formats.
There are two candidate time series. The Gallup Organization has been asking an
identically worded question on defense spending since 1969, and the General Social
Survey (GSS) has asked a similar question since 1973, although the utility of the lat-
ter is limited by a number of gaps and by the shift to biyearly administration of the
survey since 1994. We chose the Gallup question as the ‘‘core series’’ for our
inquiry, because the series begins earlier than GSS, because the question has been
asked in identical form, and because the question has been administered almost
yearly. It is also helpful that the Gallup question has been administered during the
first half of the year in most years since 1980. As Wlezien has shown (1996), public
opinion on defense spending is quite attuned to the information that is available at
particular phases of the budgetary process (presidential requests, appropriations).
Using a question administered in the first half of the year, we ensure that respondents
have been exposed to the publicity and debate that surrounds the announcement of
the president’s budget in February. When the Gallup question was not available for a
particular year, we sought first to substitute the GSS series—the most similar avail-
able alternative and one that is also administered early in the year. When the GSS
question was not available, we employed questions from other survey organizations
with wording as similar to the Gallup question as possible. Details on each data point
are described in Appendix A.
The exact wording of the Gallup question is as follows:
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There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington
should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this:
do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount?
Following a widely used measure in past research (Wlezien 1995, 1996, 2004;
Stimson 1999), we operationalize support for defense spending as net support, com-
puted as follows:
Net support ¼ % increase=ð% increaseþ%decreaseÞ100
In the analyses to follow, we compute and specify this measure of the dependent
variable for women and men separately. By employing this measure of net support,
we focus on what might be called crystallized opinion—an active stand on the issue.
Our measure is essentially the percentage of crystallized opinion that prefers an
increase in the current defense budget.2
The over time evolution of net support for defense spending among men and
women is shown in Figure 1. The top half of the figure shows the trend in net sup-
port, while the bottom half shows the gender difference (men net support – women
net support). Two features of the graphics stand out. First, women and men do rep-
resent parallel publics. That is, although there are differences between men and
women in the level of net support at particular points in time, both genders appear
to be responding to a common set of stimuli overtime. Nonetheless, the question is
whether the lower net support among women and the occasionally large gender dif-
ferences shown in the figure are produced by differential responses to the same sti-
muli or—perhaps less likely—by different correlates of net support.
Second, the variation in the magnitude of gender differences is noteworthy
(bottom half of Figure 1). The average absolute gender difference in net support
is 7.6 percentage points, slightly higher than the difference indicating statistical sig-
nificance between two survey subsamples.3 In addition, as expected, men are more
supportive of defense spending on average. Support among men is greater than
women in about three-quarters of the years in the series. In years when men are more
supportive of defense, they do so by almost 9 percentage points; when women are
more supportive, it is by a lesser amount (5.3 percentage points).
These initial findings have important implications for our analysis and for studies
of gender difference in national security more generally. First, the data show that
gender differences are not categorical: it is not the case that women are always and
in large measure less supportive of defense spending. What this means, of course, is
that explanations for gender differences that are rooted in categorical hypotheses—
such as biological differences or differences in socialization of men and women—
are not supported by the evidence. This is an important finding and one that
highlights the importance of analyzing time-series data. If categorical explanations
were true, gender differences would be uniformly large and would vary little over
time. Second, the variations in gender difference are presumably related to contex-
tual factors that move the opinions of men and women in different directions—or by
Eichenberg and Stoll 337
 at RICE UNIV on March 29, 2013jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
0
20
40
60
80
N
et
 S
up
po
rt
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Net support.  Gallup. Men Net support.  Gallup. Women
1965–2007
Net Support for Increased Defense Spending
–1
0
0
10
20
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 N
et
 S
up
po
rt:
 M
en
 - 
W
om
en
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
1965–2007
Difference in Net Support: Men - Women
Figure 1.Net support for increased defense spending, 1965–2007, difference in net support,
men - women, 1965–2007
338 Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(2)
 at RICE UNIV on March 29, 2013jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
different degrees—in particular circumstances. From what has been said above,
there is reason to believe that these differences are rooted in spending priorities and
differential reactions to war and its cost. We take up the task of modeling these fac-
tors in the following section.
A Model of Gender Difference on Defense Spending
Our theoretical interest is clear. We are interested in the impact of policy change and
other factors on change in the net support of women and men for defense spending.
Following the literature reviewed above, we specify and evaluate a regression model
of net support for women and for men that includes change in defense spending, the
occurrence of guns/butter spending trade-offs, unemployment, and the occurrence
and human cost of wars (casualties). Because the error terms in the equations for
men and women are likely to be correlated, we employ seemingly unrelated regres-
sion (see Enns and Kellstedt [2008] for a similar application).
Defense spending and spending trade-off. We specify the constant price percentage
change in defense spending in our regression model of change in the net support of
women and men (notes and sources of this and other variables are provided in
Appendix A). The reaction of public opinion to this sort of policy change is now well
understood. As Wlezien and others have shown in a number of works, the public
responds in a ‘‘thermostat’’ fashion to spending change; that is, it responds by prefer-
ring less spending when the budget increases and more spending when the budget is
cut. Supporting evidence for the ‘‘thermostat’’ response is quite robust (Wlezien 1995,
1996; Eichenberg and Stoll 2003; Soroka and Wlezien 2004, 2005). As is true in this
literature, we expect a negative sign on the parameter for defense spending change.
Less certain is the expected timing of the impact. On one hand, we have been careful
tomeasure the net support series using asmany surveys as possible fromearly each year
because of the publicity that surrounds the announcement of the budget. We therefore
expected that the change in spending from the past to the current year (percentage
change year T) would have the strongest impact. However, our initial tests of themodel
revealed that it is spending change in the past year (T 1) that has the greatest impact,
perhaps because that budget has been fully debated and appropriated, thus setting in
motion the adjustment of public opinion that becomes visible in the following year.
We report the impact of percentage change in defense at T 1 in the tables to follow.
We also specify and evaluate two measures of spending trade-off, one each for
(federal government) spending on health and social security—both programs on
which the priorities of men and women have been shown to differ in previous
research (see, for example, Crowder-Meyer, 2007, p. 10, 24-25). We operationalize
a trade-off as a dummy variable for any year in which defense spending grows faster
than each category of social spending. This occurs more frequently than might be
expected: in 17 years for health spending and 14 years for social security spending.
What we seek to tap with this measure is an indicator of the sentiment expressed in
the mythical headline reporting that ‘‘defense grows, while social spending is
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restrained.’’ Obviously, we expect a negative sign on these trade-off variables
among women, and a further expectation based on our earlier review is that the
effect should be stronger for women than for men.4
Unemployment. We observed earlier that there is some evidence that men and
women differ in their assessment of economic performance, with women demon-
strating more sensitivity to national economic conditions than men. We therefore
specify the national unemployment rate in each equation below (tests of separate
unemployment rates for men and women proved no different in their results and are
not reported here).
War and its human cost. During the period under study, the United States suffered
serious levels of battle deaths in two wars, Vietnam and Iraq. Research has shown
that the cumulative level of American deaths has a significant impact on approval
of the wars and the approval level of the president (Mueller 1973). We also noted
above that casualties appear to magnify gender difference in support for war.
Because the level of deaths is the most visible measure of cost of these wars, we
include the log to the base 10 of the cumulative yearly sum of American deaths
in Vietnam and (as a separate variable) in Iraq.5 Appendix discusses the details of
how these two variables were constructed.6
Results
The regression results, displayed in Table 2, are presented for men and women for
the entire time period and also with interactive terms representing three time periods:
the cold war years prior to the Reagan administration (the coefficients without time-
related interaction terms), the years encompassed by the Reagan defense budgets
(1982–1989), and the post–cold war years (1990 onward). We present separate,
time-bound estimates for two reasons: first, the research literature on gender differ-
ences reviewed above point to the Reagan years as the beginning—perhaps even the
stimulus—for gendered reactions to national security policy. Second, as noted ear-
lier (note 5), we evaluated several perceptual measures of external threat and fears of
war on support for defense spending, but some of these measures were available in
consistent form beginning only in the 1980s. Although we ultimately concluded that
perceptual measures do not perform better than the war death variables reported
here, in the process we observed substantially different coefficients for defense
spending change and for other variables during the 1980s.7
The results in Table 2 provide strong evidence for the dominance of the ‘‘parallel
public’’ hypothesis. Although there are some minor exceptions, and although the
correlates of support for defense spending vary by period, the effects of the variables
in the model are very similar for men and women. Consider the effects of the change
in defense spending and the trade-off variables; as we expect from the literature on
the ‘‘thermostat’’ phenomenon, the impact is strongly negative for both women and
men for the period taken as a whole and for each combination of the parameters and
interaction terms (although the significance of the impact varies by period). Notably,
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the dramatic thermostat reversal of support during the Reagan years (the 1982–1989
dummy) is actually larger for men, although it is negative for both men and women.
As a result, contrary to the gender hypothesis, the effect of the Reagan defense
increases was to reduce rather than increase the absolute value of the gender differ-
ence in support for defense spending (from 8.9 percentage points during the years
prior to 1982 to 5.8 percentage points during the Reagan years). The same is true for
the effect of Vietnam War casualties (significantly negative for both men and
women) and for Iraq War casualties (insignificant for both, although the parameters
for men and women do differ).
True, there are some specific differences: in the cold war period, the strongest
effect is defense spending change itself—the trade-off variables are not signifi-
cant—while in the Reagan period the defense/health care trade-off is large and sig-
nificant for women and much smaller and insignificant for men. Similarly, although
the coefficients for the Social Security trade-off in the post–cold war years are
mildly different for men and women, neither is statistically significant. In summary,
what is important for our analysis is that the overall pattern of effects is very similar
in the equations for men and women.
The equivalence of the parameters is confirmed by tests of inequality for each of
the equations in Table 2. With two exceptions, these tests showed that one could not
reject the hypothesis that the parameters for men and women are essentially equal.
The most important exception is the trade-off for health care spending in the Reagan
years, which is much more strongly negative and significant for women. The second
is the trade-off for Social Security in the years after 1990, but in the latter case neither
coefficient is significant. Thus, across all the years analyzed here, the single case of a
divergent parameter for men and women—when men and women did not move quite
parallel—is that for the health/defense spending trade-off during the Reagan years.
It is worth pausing to reflect on the broader meaning of the results. The literatures
on gender and policy priorities and gender and war led us to consider the hypothesis
that men and women would be differentially affected by these variables (women
more sensitive to war and spending trade-offs). The evidence here is that men and
women react to the same stimuli over time in very much the same way, a finding
that matches recent research on the dynamics of population subgroup opinion. Put
differently, the gender hypothesis would predict that the determinants of the views
of men and women would be either entirely different or different in their magnitude
or significance for men and women. This is not the case.
We should caution that this does notmean thatmen andwomen favor defense spend-
ing to the same degree; we have shown that, on average, women are less supportive of
defense, and this is true to varying degrees for each of the three periods displayed in
Table 2. Nonetheless, it does mean that these differences are not differentially affected
by defense spending, the state of the economy, defense/welfare trade-offs, or casualties
inwars. There is only one significant exception: during theReagan years—the period of
the highest defense spending increases for the period studied here—the trade-off for
defense and health spending affected women more than men.
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Conclusion
The literatures on gender politics and gender and national security contain a strong sug-
gestion that change in defense spending and in the financial and human cost of war will
have a differential impact on the support ofwomen andmen for the defense budget. Our
analysis—the first performed in the time series context—indicates that this is not the
case. Rather, the support ofwomen andmen for the defense budgetmove largely in par-
allel, or to borrow the words of Enns and Kellstadt, their views ‘‘generally changed at
the same time, in the same direction, and to about the same extent . . . (2008, 433).
This is a particularly strong finding in support of the parallel public thesis, for the
documented gender divergence in policy preferences would otherwise provide a
plausible expectation that women and men would react differently to contextual
changes in national security policy or to a shift in budgetary priorities. Indeed, as
we noted at the outset, some scholars have characterized gender as an increasingly
defining cleavage of American politics, and there are substantial arguments that
national security is an important part of that cleavage.
What explains the strength of the parallel thesis? One answer acknowledges the
existence of subgroup (gender) difference and combines this knowledge with
assumptions about the uniformity of information available to members of different
subgroups. Thus, as Page and Shapiro observe, the difference in preferences among
subgroups at any point in time captures the ‘‘equilibrium’’ difference arising from
political interests and preferences (1991, 295), but if members of the subgroups
receive uniform information about policy change, their reactions are also likely to
be uniform, with no significant change in the difference between them. That process
is visible in the similarity of coefficients for men and women presented earlier.
Of course, this does not mean that gender differences on defense budget issues have
no political import.We have seen that on averagewomen are less supportive of defense
spending, and other research shows that this difference sometimes translates into polit-
ically relevant attitudes and behavior (such as partisanship and voting). Nonetheless,
our findings do suggest that the ups and downs of defense budget debates are unlikely
to rearrange thegenderbasis ofpolitical preferencesunless thegrowthofdefense spend-
ing is so prodigious as to produce clear-cut trade-offs. This conclusion is not one that
would be derived from the literature on gender and politics or gender and national secu-
rity, but it is one that is now rooted in substantial evidence.
Appendix
This appendix describes the data definitions and sources for the variables listed in
Figure 1 and Table 2.
Net Support for Defense Spending
As we noted in the text, the default ‘‘core’’ time series of opinion surveys on
defense spending are drawn from the Gallup Organization. Gender breakdowns
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for Gallup surveys were taken from the Gallup Poll Monthly (Gallup
Organization monthly) supplemented through downloads of Gallup Polls from
the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecti-
cut. We are also grateful to the Gallup Organization for providing the gender
marginals for the most recent years. Gallup surveys represent thirty-two of the
forty-one time points included in the analysis. In four years, we employed a
similar question (variable name NATARMS) from the General Social Survey
(ICPSR Study Nr. 4697); the years are 1975, 1984, 1988, and 1996. The
remaining questions in the time series are as follows: 1965, 1966 (surveys
by the General Electric Corporation); 1992 (survey for NBS/Wall Street Jour-
nal); 1995 (survey for the Americans Talk Issues Foundation/ Market Research
Strategies); and 1997 (Pew Center for the People and the Press). All of these
latter surveys are available from the catalog of the Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research, and summary marginals and sampling information can be
displayed from the Center’s IPoll database. Our replication data set includes
the precise end date of survey sampling and the sample size for each question
used in the analysis.
Spending Variables
All of the spending data employed in the analysis were taken from the files of the
Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas. In every case, we employed the
data expressed in constant 2006 dollars of budget authority. The data and associated
codebook can be downloaded here:
http://www.policyagendas.org/datasets/index.html
The specific categories employed are as follows.
Defense spending. Subfunction 051 Department of Defense-Military (i.e., exclud-
ing expenditures for Atomic Energy related activities [053] and ‘‘Defense-related
activities’’ [054]). The subfunction does include supplemental appropriations for the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Health spending. Function 550 Health, which includes spending for (551) Health
care services, (552) Health research and training, and (554) Consumer and occupa-
tional health and safety. This category includes Medicaid spending under 551 but not
Medicare spending.
Social Security spending. Function 650, which includes spending for Social Secu-
rity (single subfunction 651 Social Security). This function (and single subfunc-
tion) funds the Old Age, Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI),
and program administration. The Policy Agendas Project has redefined budget
authority to include all authority listed separate in on-budget and off-budget
documents.
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Unemployment
This is the civilian unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted, taken from table 42 of
Economic Report of the President: 2009 Report Spreadsheet Tables
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables09.html
War and Casualty Variables
Data for Vietnammonthly battle deaths is taken from the Vietnam Veterans Memorial
Fund website (http://www.vvmf.org/index.cfm?SectionID¼110&AdvancedForm¼
true). Data for Iraq battle deaths is taken from the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count
(http://icasualties.org/oif/).
Vietnam war battle deaths. One complication for the Vietnam War data is to spe-
cify a starting date for the US involvement in the war. US military personnel were
present in Vietnam for many years; the first death recorded by the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial Fund is that of Capt. Harry Cramer who died on October 21, 1957. The
Correlates of War Project codes the start of the US involvement as February 7,
1965 (Correlates of War Project 2009). Another option is the date of the Gulf of Ton-
kin incident which took place in August 1964 and represents perhaps the clearest
political indication of the American commitment in Vietnam. For this reason, we
measure battle deaths beginning September 1964 and ending January 31, 1973 (the
Correlates of War Project dates the end of the US involvement as of January 27,
1973). Monthly totals were obtained from the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund,
and the cumulative yearly death total was calculated. Following Mueller (1973),
we then logged (base 10) the yearly death totals. We coded zero for all non-
Vietnam War years.
Iraq war battle deaths. Yearly totals from 2003 through 2007 were calculated from
the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (http://icasualties.org/oif/), and the cumulative
yearly death total was calculated. Like the Vietnam death totals, we logged (base
10) the war years and coded zero for all non–Iraq War years.
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Notes
1. The limited exceptions are the dynamic analyses of gender difference in partisan identification
reported byBox-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin (2004) and byErikson,MacKuen, and Stim-
son (2002). Toourknowledge, there are no studies of the yearlydynamicsof genderdifference
onpolicy preferences such as the one reported here, althoughElder andGreene (2007) provide
some description of NES items on defense spending for several years.
2. We prefer the net support measure because of its intuitive interpretation as the percentage
of crystallized opinion that prefers an increase in defense spending. However, as an empiri-
cal matter the ‘‘increase’’ and ‘‘decrease’’ responses are essentially mirrors—with negative
correlation of .90 (men) and .83 (women).
3. For subsamples of about 500 subjects, differences in the range of 6.3–7.9 percentage points
are significant (Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell 1959). Because Gallup actually used
substantially larger samples for much of the period of our analysis (an average sample size
of 1,337), our conclusion that the difference is significant is actually on the conservative
side. We also conducted a t test to evaluate the hypothesis that the means of the two series
are equal, and rejected the hypothesis.
4. We also investigated the impact of the budget deficit (and public opinion on the deficit) on
net support, but their influence proved very weak, perhaps because any competition among
spending categories is captured directly by the trade-off variables. The deficit was there-
fore excluded from further analysis.
5. Responding to the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we also collected a yearly series
of perceptual measures based on the Gallup Organization’s ‘‘most important problem’’
questions. Specifically, we evaluated the impact of the Gallup percentage who thought that
international threats, war generally, or specific wars was the ‘‘most important problem.’’
The impact of these measures was inferior to the measure of war casualties reported here,
so they were discarded from further analysis.
6. We also tested to see whether another form of external behavior, crisis involvement, had an
impact on male and female net support. We created three variables from the International
Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set (Brecher andWilkenfeld, 2000): the yearly number of crises
involving the United States, the yearly number of crises involving Russia, and the yearly
number of ICB crises. Lagging these variables, none of them had any impact on male or
female net support.
7. The broader literature on gender differences in partisanship and voting behavior focus on
the 1980s as the period in which differences began to widen. See Kaufmann and Petrocik
(1999).
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